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Onto-Technics in Bryant, Harman, and Nancy 
SUSANNA LINDBERG 
 
The title “onto-technics” points at, or actually unfolds, an apparently 
contradictory task of thinking at the same time the dignified, timeless 
questions of ontology and the instable swirl of everchanging concrete 
technologies. It suggests that thinking ontology in terms of technics has 
become a timely task for philosophy and that the best way to undertake 
this task is by examining the conflict between ontology and technics.  
 
To start with, we need to clarify the philosophical concept of 
technics. The root of the concept, and not only the word, is the Greek term 
techné, which was defined by Aristotle as the art of producing things that 
do not have their aim in themselves and that can also be otherwise or not 
be at all (Nicomachean Ethics, 6, 4.1, 1140a 6-25). Being pure means, 
techné cannot really come to being without aims set by human beings—or 
by nature itself (Aristotle, Physics, 194a21 and 199a15). Aristotle 
understood techné primarily as an art or a skill, like the know-how of the 
doctor, or like anything that we might today put under the term of 
technique. In another sense, techné would reside in technical objects, such 
as tools, instruments, and equipment that are presently included in the 
term technology. By “technics” I will denote the entire constellation of 
subjective techniques and technological objects, which are both 
indispensable aspects of the philosophical question of techné. The German 
Technik and the French technique, which are the subject of many of my 
sources, have been translated into English quite variably as technics, 
technique, and technology. In order to give unity to my argument, I will 
favour technics, but I will also use the other terms when they have been 
chosen by the authors commented upon.  
 
In the Aristotelian framework of thought, technics did not exist by 
nature but was always somehow produced, and this is why it was always 
artificial. Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and Diderot were 
interested in this artificiality that did not characterize only the objects of 
human industry but much more essentially human culture, which can be 
sublimated into techniques and arts of living together as well as degraded 
into dead mechanisms of an artificial society1: as Hegel put it in the 
                                              
1 See in particular Diderot’s D’Alembert’s Dream and Rousseau’s Discourse on the 
Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men.  




famous analysis of Bildung in his Phenomenology of Spirit, Enlightenment 
brought out the ambiguity of human artifice that is at the same time the 
cause of alienation and of culture, art, and progress. 
 
However, as Bernard Stiegler has shown in the introduction to his 
fundamental work Technics and Time I, throughout the classical period of 
philosophy, technics was never a central object of inquiry. In this period, 
philosophy rarely thought that technics, being pure means, could add its 
own mark in the human activities that it was means for, as if it had aims of 
its own. This conception would begin to change with industrialization, and 
it was thoroughly revised in the 20th century by the Marxist philosophers 
of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse) as well as by 
many phenomenological philosophers (Husserl and especially Heidegger). 
These thinkers realized that modern industrial technologies had become 
much more than simple tools of human intentions: they had grown into a 
planetary system that has an instrumental rationality and, in a manner of 
speaking, aims of its own. Increasingly, human beings were reduced to 
tools and resources of the technological system, rather than the contrary. 
At this time, technics was thought of as a horizon determined by modern 
technology that imprints its forms and logics onto human beings, 
overdetermining their techniques of living. In this new situation, the 
philosophical problem of technics was interpreted in terms of a technical 
system (Ellul) and especially in terms of Ge-stell, Heidegger’s famous 
word for the essence of technics. Around the middle of the 20th century, 
the tone of the continental interpretations of technics tended to be very 
critical, as technics was seen as a domain of artificiality threatening the 
acquisition of truth (thought in terms of image and representation, technics 
appeared closer to simulation than to truth). From this perspective, what is 
without truth necessarily lacks ontological foundations and prevents the 
positing of the question of being, as Martin Heidegger said in his famous 
analyses of the epoch of technics. 
 
In what I call here the post-phenomenological2 developments of the 
latter half of the 20th century, the role of technics has gradually changed. 
On the one hand, Simondon has sought to analyze the technical object in 
itself and not only in relation to human aims and social needs. In doing so, 
he looked for a positive interpretation of technical objects, underlining 
their role in the creation of new associated milieux in which human beings 
find themselves implicated, thus paving the way for Deleuze and 
                                              
2 The term “post-phenomenology” does not refer to a school of philosophy whose 
members would identify themselves through a common program. I use the term simply as 
a shorthand that singles out thinkers who, like Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy, are 
influenced by phenomenology but also by its critiques by other currents of thought, such 
as post-structuralism, and that cannot therefore be counted simply as phenomenologists. 
 




Guattari’s readings of the world in terms of “machines.” On the other 
hand, in Jacques Derrida’s work, and even more explicitly in the works of 
Bernard Stiegler, the un-truth of technics appears as the quasi-
transcendental condition that makes it possible to examine, not the 
ontological foundation of the world, but, on the contrary, its lack of any 
such foundation. As an excellent illustration of an ontology of lack and 
negativity, technics also appeared as an invitation to investigate other 
modalities of logos and sense rather than transcendent ideas or scientific 
truths.3 
 
These introductive remarks bring us to our subject, namely to the 
question of an ontological interpretation of technics. In the history of 
philosophy of technics, the outline of which I have just sketched, technics 
was mostly interpreted in an anthropological context in the light of the 
question of what technics does to the human being. However, a very 
different, ontological perspective has emerged recently. If, in the 20th 
century, interest in technics often went hand in hand with an interest in 
knowledge and language that prevailed over traditional problematics of 
being, the 21st century has witnessed a strong renewal of interest in 
ontology in all currents of philosophy. Today, even analytical philosophy, 
which had long been hostile to metaphysical constructions, studies the 
ontological foundations of reality, the fundamental structure of which is 
postulated to be consistent with mathematical natural sciences like 
quantum mechanics. Phenomenology has approached ontology in a very 
different manner because it necessarily includes some existential 
concerns—but these have spanned from the experimental sciences, like 
biology and psychology, which interested Merleau-Ponty, to art and 
religion, which have traditionally confronted the entire problematics of the 
sense of existence. 
 
It is in this landscape that I would like to examine a particular 
hypothesis according to which technics, far from blocking the way to the 
question of Being, gives privileged access to ontology. The concept of 
technics is not useful to ontology for the reason that it is self-evident that 
our contemporary lifeworld is massively determined by technological 
objects and systems. Of course it is: we do not need to use and understand 
all modern gadgets in order to recognize the concrete presence of technics 
everywhere and, more fundamentally, we do not need to know what 
technics is in order to see that technics is there. There is technics, il y a la 
technique. However, we are only interested here in the philosophical 
advantages of the examination of Being through technics. Firstly, techno-
                                              
3 I take the liberty of referring to two articles in which I explain Heidegger’s and 
Derrida’s views on technology in more detail: “Lost in the World of Technology with and 
after Heidegger” and “Derrida’s Quasi-Technique.” 
 




ontologies will turn out to be necessarily materialist, and this is why they 
allow us to bypass the theological undercurrents of many 
phenomenological ontologies that (from Heidegger to Jean-Luc Marion 
and beyond) are directed towards truth as well as the nihilistic 
problematics of the end of thinking that haunt many post-
phenomenological approaches (especially Maurice Blanchot). Secondly, 
the artificiality of technics also prevents its explication in terms of 
naturalist materialism, which has turned out to be quite problematic as 
well. Of course, “nature” means different things in different contexts: 
some philosophers, like Rousseau, postulate “nature” as a domain of 
purity behind “culture” (which is nonetheless accessed through culture) 
whereas others, especially in the analytic tradition, understand “nature” as 
the referent of the natural sciences (that is nonetheless accessed via 
scientific instruments and hypotheses), but all find themselves incapable 
of reaching nature in itself. 
 
Now, unlike God or Nature, technics is not an inaccessible source of 
truth, for it is a historical reality that is immediately known to all. 
Technics is neither true nor false by itself. Rather, it is an interface 
between science, nature, and human beings; it has an intermediary way of 
being that cannot be reduced to natural necessity or to human freedom. If 
it is evident that technics determines our reality overwhelmingly (even if it 
is not clear how it does this), this is not because we are ignorant of our 
condition but because technics is essentially ambiguous. As classical 
philosophers have shown since the time of Plato, technics is artificial, 
illusory, and false. It does not really reveal nature but at most imitates it, 
and never without at the same time disguising, modifying, or polluting it. 
Religion and science promise, albeit differently, an inaccessible truth 
eventually transmitted through eminent emissaries. Technics does not 
offer any such truths (it is on the contrary famous for its illusions)—but it 
is familiar and we know how it furnishes our world. The philosophical 
sense of technics is very close to that of “world,” for it determines our 
immediate environment, but it is a world without sense and unity, a world 
of pure mediation, relation, change, and contingency. 
 
Because technics is worldly and terrestrial, it is also material—but it 
demands that we redefine the very sense of materiality. We will soon see 
that in contemporary philosophy, the “materiality” of technics has nothing 
to do with the ultimate building blocks of reality (like in antique 
materialisms) or with the productive processes of human society (like in 
dialectical materialism), both of which provided a positive ground for 
reality. On the contrary, the materiality of technics is so abstract that it is 
almost immaterial, hardly more than an experience of withdrawal of the 
principles of the articulation of being. Almost immaterial, technics is 
nonetheless material, but in such an overwhelming and protean manner 
that it is impossible to reveal it directly as such.  
 




Against the background of these general considerations, I would 
now like to show how the “materiality” of technics has been used by 
several contemporary thinkers to articulate their ontological projects. Most 
prominent such approaches have come from the post-phenomenological 
tradition, others from the “school” of “speculative realism in its various 
anti-phenomenological manifestations.4 In what follows, I will give two 
examples of the speculative realist techno-ontologies and compare them 
with a phenomenological one. Through this quick review and comparison, 
I hope to pinpoint the general stakes of the question. 
 
I. Bryant’s Machines and Harman’s Tool-Being 
“Speculative realism” and “object-oriented ontology” name a 
contemporary current of philosophy whose proponents differ from one 
another in important ways while sharing a fundamental attitude towards 
the task of philosophy. The current was inspired by the critique of 
“correlationism,” formulated by Quentin Meillassoux in After Finitude, 
according to which philosophers from Kant through Husserl, Heidegger, 
and up until Derrida examine reality only as the subject’s projection, thus 
falling short of the philosophical task of examining reality as such. I will 
not discuss Meillassoux’s theory, which has been widely commented upon 
(and criticized, see note viii). Instead, I will examine two approaches that 
could rather be situated in the camp of object-oriented ontology and that 
articulate their ontologies in terms of technics. Of course, speculative 
realism and object-oriented ontology are simply very general indications 
of intellectual inheritances and affinities: the thinkers in question do not 
realize a common program. 
 
Levi R. Bryant’s Onto-Cartography presents an ontological system 
that aims to reformulate materialism in today’s context. Bryant is opposed 
to post-structuralists insofar as they are thought to only consider discursive 
or signifying entities, and he proposes to analyze the world purely in terms 
of material realities. There are no hierarchies between entities so that, say, 
“banyan trees, sequoias, cephalopods… microbes, viruses, Amazonian 
rain forests, coral reefs and hitherto yet unimagined technologies” (Bryant 
xi)—everything whatsoever—are equal realities that are themselves 
composed of other realities and that compose other bigger entities. 
Everything, even ideas and concepts, is material in this way. But “matter” 
is nothing massive or substantial. Bryant’s key conceptual choice—a 
direct continuation of Deleuze and Guattari’s famous thesis in Anti-
                                              
4 “Speculative realism” was first of all the name of a colloquium held at Goldsmith, 
London University, in April 2007 with Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham 
Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux. 




Œdipus—is to call all such elementary units of being “machines.”5 He 
defines a machine as a being that functions or operates (1). A machine 
does not need to be rigid and “material” in the everyday sense of the word, 
for there are also many abstract and creative machines. This is possible 
because machines (for instance, trees) are not designed, and even the 
machines that are constructed by human beings (for instance, chairs) result 
from negotiations between constructors, materials, and machines, rather 
than from the imposition of a form on matter (17-20). Machines do not 
have in-built purposes or uses either, but they can become media for other 
machines: “A machine functions as a medium for another machine … 
whenever it modifies the activity or becoming of any other machine” (33). 
Onto-cartography is the investigation of such structural couplings between 
machines: it maps the couplings between machines, the modifications that 
these couplings induce, and explores territories (or “ecologies”) that are 
opened in this way (35). 
 
If everything is machine—a plurality of machines—what is a 
machine? “A machine is a system of operations that perform 
transformations on inputs thereby producing outputs” (Bryant 38). 
Machines are not stable things but they are their functioning: they are 
defined in terms of what they take in, modify, and produce. In the constant 
flow of functioning, machines are plastic things. In their functioning, 
machines are connected to other machines, in such a way that reality is 
entirely transcorporeal—they are media to one another, not just to 
anything that happens to be close, but selectively to what functions with 
them. This is how machines make assemblies that are immediately new 
machines (77). There is no void between machines, machines act on one 
another via media that are themselves machines (118). 
 
As I cannot present Bryant’s entire system here, I will only present 
its general structure with the help of one of his principal examples: climate 
change. Bryant is strongly opposed to the phenomenological way of 
understanding reality as the world of somebody (for instance Dasein). 
Instead, he thinks “world” in terms of “ecologies” in which all kinds of 
machines are connected, where their functions are not determined relative 
to a privileged being (113). In this case, climate is thought as the ensemble 
of climatic systems and not as the weather that affects human beings in a 
given place. The study of an ecology thus consists of three stages. Firstly, 
                                              
5 Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus famously starts like this: “It is at work 
everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it 
heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is 
machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines 
being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections” (8). 
Bryant echoes this in his definition of machines: “They whirr, they buzz, they spin, and 
rumble. A world is a fabric of machines” (37). 




one has to establish its topology, that is to say, show how its machines are 
related to one another (and not how they are situated in a given space-
time). This does not mean that one should reduce entities to their relations, 
because then it would be impossible to explain the fact that sometimes 
entities manage to escape their situations (181). As a matter of fact, 
planetary climate is an excellent example of the way in which all kinds of 
(natural, technological, social, etc.) entities are connected without being 
reduced to mere effects of the climate. Secondly, in order to study an 
ecology, one has to indicate the “gravity” of a machinic assembly—
knowing that gravity is not a machine’s power over another one but the 
way in which the becoming of a machine is mediated by another (193). 
For instance, the electoral campaign of a big country can “weigh” on 
world’s climate even if the latter was not an explicit theme of the former. 
And thirdly, the study of an ecology requires that one cartographies it, 
deconstructs the relations of gravity that rule over it, and terraformates 
other possible ecologies (279). For instance, one can cartography the 
present climatic change, deconstruct machinic assemblies that function in 
it by showing how they contribute to changes in the climate (knowingly or 
not), and propose to change these assemblies in order to permit other kinds 
of terraformation (for instance, how does contemporary industrial 
agriculture contribute to climatic change and what kind of reorganisations 
of agricultural practices would lower its climatic impact?). 
 
Bryant’s “onto-carto-graphy” is attractive, for it is a beautiful 
assembly of conceptual machines that fit and work together well. Bryant 
uses contemporary natural scientific terms (like topological space, gravity, 
black hole, dim and bright objects, and so on), giving them new roles as 
operators of a materialist ontology. What is more, his ontology reflects 
progressive political concerns, of which the ecology of climatic change is 
only an example. However, Bryant’s construction also poses a number of 
important questions. Like all successors of the speculative realist 
thematics, he rejects all examination of the subject position, and this is 
why he never examines or justifies his own approach to ontology. He 
therefore leaves unanswered a question that is to my mind decisive: what 
is the status of his speculation? His system is really a speculative 
construction made of scientific terms that are not used scientifically but—
in all senses of the word—fantastically. This system is a game of 
imagination that toys with science but cannot be proven by it, or by 
anything else, and this is why it could be taken for a dogmatic position. 
For a thinker like Deleuze this would not be a problem because the 
criterion of a concept is less its truth than its capacity of functioning and 
producing effects. From this point of view one could say, for instance, that 
the political usefulness of Bryant’s system does not make it true but shows 
it to be useful and maybe even just. Nevertheless, as a philosophical 
system, Bryant’s ontology would be more solid if he explicitly addressed 
this problematic. 





Another thinker inspired by speculative realism who has constructed 
an ontology on a technological motive is Graham Harman, who develops, 
ever since Tool-Being, an ontology of “tool-being.” He underlines that 
“tool-being” is not a philosophy of technology but a general ontology 
(Tool-Being 180). Harman says: “If this is ‘materialism,’ then it is the first 
materialism in history to deny the existence of matter … instead of 
materialism, it is perhaps a new sort of ‘formalism’” (293). (To me it 
seems, however, that one could also claim that all philosophical 
materialisms are very abstract theories about the form of matter, but this is 
not the point here). In what follows, I will present Harman’s “object-
oriented ontology” very briefly, only in order to see how one can come to 
think Being as tool. I will not follow his system any further because his 
concepts and his readings of philosophers, including Heidegger, who is the 
very subject of Tool-being, would need to be addressed through lengthy 
commentaries, which is not my purpose here. 
 
“Tool-being” is Harman’s theory of being. It is based on the famous 
analysis of the tool (Zeug) developed by Heidegger in Being and Time, but 
with an important change: tool-being is not about human praxis, but about 
the way in which things are in themselves. 
 
The true question of philosophy is not between humans and reality 
(Dasein-Zeug) but between objects and relations … humans, dogs, 
oak trees, comets, ice cubes and atoms are on the same level. One 
should not exile objects into natural sciences, with condescence and 
fear, but make a real philosophical analysis of things in themselves. 
(Harman, Tool-Being 2-3) 
 
In addition to this counter-phenomenological principle, Harman supports 
an anti-post-structuralist and anti-analytical-philosophical principle 
according to which reality consists in objects, not in linguistic units of 
sense (180). 
 
In the end, Harman claims that Heidegger was mistaken in 
everything except in his analysis of tools, and even there he was mistaken 
insofar he understood tools merely in terms of human equipment.6 
                                              
6 Among countless examples one can quote for instance Harman’s claim that “Heidegger 
is a rather monotonous philosopher who has almost no other subject than the constant 
reversal between absence and presence, or tool and broken tool” (The Quadruple Object 
51). Then: “Heidegger more than anyone else is the one who has shown this. By contrast, 
the Zuhandenheit of entities is apparently bound up with human use, and Heidegger adds 
that tools are not isolated, but exist in a global system. Yet to accept this at face value is 
to take the word ‘tool’ too literally, for we have seen that the tool-being of a thing 
withdraws not just from human theory and praxis, but from any relations at all” (54). 
Reducing Heidegger to his analysis of the tool’s Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, and 
then detaching the tool from the Dasein who uses it, amounts to mishandling Heidegger 
so strongly that one wonders why Heidegger should be cited at all. 




According to Harman, objects are not only meaningful for human beings, 
who would decide what they are and what they are for. Instead, objects 
also signify to one another, they are for the sake of one another (Tool-
Being 34). Within the cosmos, all things are “tools,” which means that 
they are composed of the two dimensions of Vorhandenheit and 
Zuhandenheit, which Harman translates quite quickly into “tool” and 
“broken tool,” defined as objects examined in context vs. objects released 
from their contexture. Detached from the context of the analytic of Dasein 
and of the “hand,” tool-being is not the visible realm of things but the 
invisible realm of being from which the visible realm of things emerges 
(24).  
 
If in Tool-being, Harman examines objects insofar as, according to 
him, they “exist in utter isolation from all others” (Guerrilla Metaphysics 
2), in Guerrilla Metaphysics, he attempts to show how events and 
relations between objects are possible. Now, rejecting the 
phenomenological idea of appearing (to the subject), Harman has to 
explain the getting-out-of-oneself of totally closed objects in another 
manner, and this is why he says that although objects cannot enter into 
relations, their qualities can (20). At first, it is difficult to see how qualities 
could serve as mediators between objects because qualities are also objects 
(164-165), which seems to lead to an infinite regress of increasingly 
smaller and impenetrable intermediary objects. Harman claims to solve 
this problem by introducing elements that mediate between objects, 
elements being “a face turned by one object towards another” (166). 
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how objects could be at the same time 
entirely withdrawn into themselves and nonetheless facing one another. In 
his definition of the element, Harman refers to the “carnal 
phenomenology” of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and 
Alphonso Lingis, although he is also opposed to them insofar as, 
according to him, they think the elemental as only the formless il y a. 
Harman’s own concept of element is quite different, he insists, insofar as 
the elements are many and turned towards one another instead of being a 
unitary dimension of being that withdraws from sight. Thus, in Harman’s 
thinking, the elements are synonymous with qualities or sensations and 
they function as the building blocks of reality. Harman just affirms that the 
element, being an object’s facing towards another, is the mediator in the 
“vicarious causation” thanks to which closed objects can nevertheless be 
related to one another (Guerrilla Metaphysics 159-178). We will not dwell 
any longer on Harman’s theory, but we can simply point out what seems 
to us to be its core problem: once one has defined objects to be 
inaccessible in-themselves, every solution to build a bridge between 
objects appears like a deus ex machina. 
What have Bryant and Harman taught us concerning the utility of 
examining being in terms of technique? Both speak about being with the 




help of a technological metaphor: “ontology of machines” and “tool-
being.” No doubt, this choice helps them avoid relying on concepts 
defined, for instance, in theology, mathematics, or the natural sciences and 
allows them to construct a purely philosophical system that does not rely 
on exterior justifications. At the same time, this very advantage can also 
be a handicap because the authors examined here do not explain their 
choice of a technological vocabulary. After all, the current signification of 
a technical object (such as “machine” and “tool”) is an artificial thing that 
has been constructed in view of something else than itself. Ordinarily, 
artificial things imply a constructor and an operator, and this is why some 
kind of a subject position is inscribed so strongly in the term itself that its 
suppression risks producing, so to speak, an artificial definition of 
artificiality. The question arises as to whether it would not be easier to 
avoid the problem by speaking only about “material beings.” Or if 
“matter” sounds too inert, why not speak about “living beings” (knowing 
that the vitalist philosophy of nature that culminates in Whitehead is closer 
than one might suppose here)? Bryant and Harman do not answer the 
question “Why technique?” any more than Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-
Œdipus, as if the choice of the term could be dictated by a simple aesthetic 
or ideological preference. 
 
Bryant and Harman do not only share a terminological preference, 
they also share a more general philosophical commitment. Both depict 
reality as a multiplicity without totality and speak about it in terms of 
ecology. Both postulate that machines/tools are closed, impenetrable, and 
incapable of touching one another. In order to relate these to one another, 
both authors insist on mediators: Bryant calls them media, whereas 
Harman calls them elements. Bryant analyses the media in terms that 
come from astrophysics and Harman uses a mixture of philosophical terms 
from carnal phenomenology and classical empiricism. Yet, it is far from 
clear why objects should be hermetically closed. This requires our object-
oriented philosophers to add other, mediating objects between the objects 
proper; and, because the mediating objects are not ontologically different 
from the objects proper, and are thus also closed, we are led to an infinite 
regress in which still other objects are needed to build the bridge between 
objects, ad infinitum. Below we will see another solution to an analogous 
problem that is in my opinion more elegant: it comes from Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s thinking of the “ecotechnology” of “singular plural being” in 
such a way that beings—“corpora”—are never closed but always already 
open and exposed towards one another, being finally nothing else but this 
exposition. Contrary to what Harman says of Nancy, the latter does not 
presuppose an indistinct mass of being that cannot explain its own 
fragmentation.7 Nancy does not reduce beings to their relations either, for 
                                              
7 According to Harman, the core of Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking would be “[the] shapeless 
‘whatever’ preceding all specific beings” (The Quadruple Object 8-9)—but, on the 




the singulars are really event-experiences that can only be exposed on the 
ground of the withdrawal (of what is not seen, known, etc.). Nancy’s post-
phenomenological solution seems more elegant to me than the speculative 
realist solution because it avoids the problem of the regressum infinitum of 
mediators. 
 
What differentiates Harman from Bryant is the philosophical 
framework. Bryant speaks in a Deleuzian context: this is why he explores 
territories and seeks to cartography them. Harman speaks in a 
phenomenological (Heideggerian) context, which he attempts to 
deconstruct. His program appears much more problematic because he 
wishes to suppress the very heart of phenomenology—the interrogation of 
subjectivity—while keeping some of its terms (Vorhandenheit and 
Zuhendenheit, sensations, carnality, elementality, etc.) that were originally 
defined entirely in relation to subjectivity. He bypasses the fact that even a 
deconstructed subjectivity (carnality, elementarity, singular plural being) 
is still an account of subjectivity without which the terms are stripped of 
their significance. 
 
Bryant and Harman share two features that actually go together, 
namely the overlooking of the problem of subjectivity and the arbitrary 
character of their systems. Consequently, the question of method is not 
touched by these thinkers, especially by Harman, as Peter Wolfendale 
shows in his Object-Oriented Philosophy.8 The decision of overlooking 
the question of the subject that is inherited from initial speculative realism 
leaves them unable to explain the status of their constructions. 
Consequently, they can only appear fantastic and imaginative, at best, and 
dogmatic, at worst. Nothing can verify a theory of an ontology of 
machines and media or of tool-being: they are to be found neither in 
experience nor in science, they are just imaginary structures and mind-
games. This does not have to pose a problem, for the artificial and 
contingent character of the system can be taken to reflect and illustrate the 
arbitrary and contingent character of Being that is under scrutiny 
(contingency was already the fundamental modality of Being in 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude). But it seems to me that the justification of 
such an artificial system requires an explicit examination of its character 
as an artificial construction, as a philosophical machine or tool constructed 
by a philosopher-technician who does not claim that his/her construction is 
                                                                                                                
contrary, Nancy defines his thinking of singular plural being by opposing it to the 
thinking of being as One: “The plurality of beings is at the foundation [fondement] of 
Being. A single being is a contradiction in terms” (Being Singular Plural 12). 
8 See the chapter 2, “The Withdrawal of Arguments,” of Wolfendale’s Object-Oriented 
Philosophy. 
 




exactly true, but that it is efficient, useful, or beautiful. But this would also 
require taking into consideration the subject position. 
 
II. Nancy’s Ecotechnology 
In numerous texts, philosophers issuing from the (post-)phenomenological 
tradition have sternly rejected the accusation of “correlationism.” 
Meillassoux’s critique is no doubt simplistic—he attacks a rickety “straw 
man” without paying heed to the fact that it is impossible to reduce post-
Kantian philosophy to a Berkeleyan esse est percipi when numerous 
philosophers since Nietzsche have deconstructed the very principle of 
subjectivity (just think of Freud, Heidegger, Foucault, and also early 
Nancy,9 whose later works we will soon examine). We will not linger on 
this well-known debate here.10 What interests me is not the question of 
subjectivity but the theme of technique in contemporary ontology. Out of 
the “post-phenomenological” tradition I choose Jean-Luc Nancy, who has 
since 1990 occasionally analyzed being in terms of ecotechnology 
(écotechnie might be better translated as ecotechnics, but I follow the 
translator’s choice here).  
 
In a very general manner, one can differentiate philosophers who 
draw their inspiration from phenomenology (even in deconstructed form) 
from speculative realists by noting that the former refer ontology to 
experience, and in particular to the experience of the world. The concept 
of world is necessarily connected to a “subject” (or Dasein) who has 
experience of it, but at the same time the world is not the projection of the 
subject but, on the contrary, a concrete situation given to the subject. 
Being in the world constitutes the subject, although it might do so only 
negatively, as a loss of world and of self. One could say wryly that what 
speculative realists do not see is the givenness of the world even when it 
does not “make world.” 
Given phenomenology’s search for primordial ground (Husserl’s 
attempt at regrounding sciences in the life-world, Heidegger’s valorisation 
of physis, etc), one might think that the phenomenological tradition would 
                                              
9 Nancy’s deconstruction of subjectivity is presented in a concise manner by Marie-Eve 
Morin in her introduction to the English translation of Nancy’s Ego Sum (xv-xxviii). 
10 One can admire a particularly witty way of warding off the anti-subjectivist attack in 
Slavoj Žižek’s Less than Nothing (2012). Žižek shows how Meillassoux’s critique was 
already turned down by Hegel, not to mention later thinkers like Lacan or—surprise!—
quantum theory (Žižek 621-647). A similar argument is developed by Frank Ruda in 
“The Speculative Family” and by Alenka Zupancic in “Realism in Psychoanalysis.” 
Another effective criticism is Catherine Malabou’s Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and 
Rationality. 
 




favour the natural world instead of its technological duplicates: it would 
take technics as a domain of alienation, illusion, and falsehood behind 
which philosophy should seek nature, physis, or authenticity. However, it 
would not be difficult to show that already Heidegger (whom one takes to 
be the main defender of the anti-technological party) is actually a great 
thinker of the fact that, in all cases and necessarily, technique frames the 
world. After him, Nancy has constructed a techno-ontology that goes 
much further, firstly by analyzing technology in the context of the 
contemporary world as “ecotechnology,” and secondly by enlarging the 
hermeneutics of contemporary “ecotechnology” into a study of its 
ontological condition. The characterization of Nancy’s ontology as being a 
techno-ontology does not come directly from himself: although the word 
ecotechnology was coined by Nancy, it is not the only name for his 
thinking of “singular plural being”—it is, rather, only one of its aspects. 
The interpretation of Nancy’s singular plural being as a techno-ontology 
has been developed in particular by Erich Hörl, whose interpretation is 
indispensable here.11 
 
Before describing Nancy’s techno-ontology, let me say a few words 
about why his thinking is not affected by the critique of correlationism. In 
general, Nancy’s thinking of the world, 
is not so much about a subject and a world as it is about references 
that send the world back into itself and to itself, about the profusion 
of these referrals and the way that they thus create what could be 
called a sense, a sense of the world that is nothing other than its 
appearing with: that there is a world, and all that is in the world, and 
not nothing. (Nancy, “Of Struction” 53) 
In order to understand why this is not a reflection of the world by the 
subject but the reflection of the world in itself, it is necessary to remember 
some other features of Nancy’s thinking. According to the fundamental 
axiom of his ontology, being is not one, “but at the ground of being there 
is a plurality of being.”12 Being is plural, but contrary to “tool-beings” or 
                                              
11 Nancy speaks of ecotechnics already in Corpus but also in Being Singular Plural (133-
140) and in The Sense of the World (101-102, 138-139). The theme is well highlighted by 
Erich Hörl in “The Artificial Intelligence of Sense.” See also Hörl’s “A thousand 
Ecologies” and “Le nouveau paradigme écologique.”  
12 “A single being is a contradiction in terms. Such a being, which would be its own 
foundation, origin, and intimacy, would be incapable of Being, in every sense that this 
expression can have here. ‘Being’ is neither a state nor a quality, but rather the action 
according to which what Kant calls ‘the [mere] positing of a thing,’ takes place (‘is’). The 
very simplicity of ‘position’ implies no more, although no less, than its being discrete, in 
the mathematical sense, or its distinction from, in the sense of with, other (at least 
possible) positions, or its distinction among, in the sense of between, other positions. In 
other words, every position is also dis-position, and, considering the appearing that takes 
the place of and takes place in the position, all appearance is co-appearance [com-




“machines,” these “beings” are not closed in on themselves like the 
building blocks of Being, the mediations between which remain 
inexplicable. Instead, for Nancy, the sense of being is existing, that is to 
say, being-to-oneself-outside-of-oneself. “Exposition, here, is the very 
being (what’s called ‘existing’)” (Nancy, Corpus 35). Existence is always 
exposed to other existences: things cannot exist alone because the very 
sense of existence comes from other existences. In this way, existence is 
shared (partagée): it does not mean that existents would belong to any 
supposedly common Being, but that they are with one another. (In passing 
we can note that although Nancy thinks singular existence “in relation or 
as relation,” for instance in The Experience of Freedom, his way of 
thinking existence as shared existence does not boil down to the 
“relational ontology,” such as the one rejected Harman. For although the 
existence of the one is conditioned by its exposition to the other, this does 
not mean that everything would be only relation, with beings entirely lost 
in one another, because the correlate of exposition is the withdrawal of the 
secret “heart of being”). In Being Singular Plural, existents are above all 
human beings in their being-with (Mitsein). However, Corpus shows that 
the world of bodies/things (corp[u]s means both) consists in all kinds of 
things, human and animal, natural and technical: 
Hoc est enim: this world-here, stretched out here, with its 
chlorophyll, its solar galaxy, its metamorphic rocks, its protons, its 
deoxyribonucleic double helix, its Avogadro number, its continental 
drift, its dinosaurs, its ozone layer, the stripes of its zebra, its human 
beast, Cleopatra’s nose, the number of petals on a daisy, the ghost of 
a rainbow, the style of Rubens, a python’s skin, André’s face in this 
photo taken on January 16, this blade of grass and the cow that 
grazes on it, the nuance of an iris in the eye of the one reading this 
very word, here and now? (Nancy, Corpus 33) 
In “Of Struction,” Nancy observes that this does not necessarily amount to 
a world anymore: “Still the bits and pieces or ‘elements’—which are never 
elementary enough—of this great ‘element’—in the sense of a milieu or 
an ecosystem which is an ecotechnology—constantly escape the grasp of 
every construction” (52). Existence is the way in which all human beings 
“touch” one another, but also all kinds of bodies and things touch one 
another, without limit, without hierarchy. As Nancy says even more 
clearly in After Fukushima, contemporary events like the Fukushima 
nuclear accident show especially clearly that the world is not only the 
community of human beings but the connection of all kinds of beings and 
events—natural, technological, economical, social. As unique, singular, 
                                                                                                                
parution]. This is why the meaning of Being is given as existence, being-in-oneself 
outside-oneself, which we make explicit, we ‘humans,’ but which we make explicit, as I 
have said, for the totality of beings” (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 12). 




and incommensurable as they may be, they are also equal in the sense of 
equally existent and equally world-building. 
 
Nancy underlines that in this general equivalence of existence, the 
distinction between physis and techne has lost its pertinence. If, following 
Aristotle, techne is both an imitation of physis and also what brings to 
completion what physis cannot do alone, technique is not the other of 
nature but a part of its own growth. At the same time, there is no nature 
that would not already be technical and open to technical supplements 
(Nancy, “Of Struction” 46-47). In other words, the opposition between 
technique and nature that was a constitutive distinction for enlightenment 
thought has given way to a generalized techno-nature (as exemplified 
especially by phenomena such as global warming and contemporary 
biotechnology).  
 
How does this affect our notion of the world? In traditional 
philosophy until at least Heidegger, “world” was understood as a world of 
sense: world was more or less coextensive with a cultural, religious, 
political, and scientific community. A world that has a sense is a world 
that has an aim, a telos, a spiritual aim that is not a simple consequence of 
natural or technological processes. In the middle of the 20th century, 
philosophers and other cultivated people were often worried about the 
extinction of such aims: although technological evolution had become 
quicker than ever, spiritual aims seemed to disappear. The end of a world 
that makes sense seemed to be like the end of the world itself, for instance 
in a technological apocalypse. Lack of sense as the ground of the world 
appeared mostly nihilistic and cynical. According to Nancy, today’s 
globalized world is neither a world with aim and sense nor a world based 
on pure lack. But how to describe it then? Having lost spiritual sense, it is 
driven by natural, technological (and economical) evolution. In order to 
describe this globalized techno-ecological evolution, Nancy invents the 
term ecotechnology/ecotechnics (écotechnie): 
 
Our world is the world of the “technical,” a world whose cosmos, 
nature, gods, entire system is, in its inner joints, exposed as 
“technical”: the world of the ecotechnical. … The ecotechnical 
creates the world of bodies in two correlative ways: for the 
projections of linear histories and final ends, it substitutes the 
spacings of time, local differences, and numerous bifurcations. The 
ecotechnical deconstructs the system of ends, renders them 
unsystemizable, nonorganic, even stochastic (except through an 
imposition of the ends of political economy or capital…). At the 
same time, the ecotechnical, linking and connecting up bodies in 
every way, placing them at sites of the intersections, interfaces, and 
interactions of every technical procedure, far from turning bodies 
into “technical objects” (as is often said today, by those who think, 
furthermore, that they know what a “technical object” is) sheds light 




on them as such, through this areal connection, which also creates 
space for the withdrawal of any transcendental or immanent 
signification. (Nancy, Corpus 89) 
 
“Ecotechnology” is partly a description of an epoch: it describes our epoch 
insofar as it has given up political and spiritual forms of sovereignty and 
goes on as an endless economical and technological administration of 
things (Nancy, Being Singular Plural 129-144). Technique has 
traditionally been understood as a domain with no proper aims: technique 
is the means of nature’s or human beings’ aims but it does not have any 
aims of its own. Now that nature’s and human beings’ aims have 
disappeared, what remains is technique, a domain of “means without 
aims” as Agamben would say as well, which endlessly changes its means 
into aims without being able to give these aims any definite character. 
 
“Ecotechnology” is also a name of an ontological structure that our 
epoch has brought to the fore. It claims that being is the being of 
technonature in such a way that technics (technique and technology) is not 
an imitation of being but the originary appearing of being. Furthermore, 
technics does not represent whatever appears but all appearing is 
techn(olog)ical. This can be taken as a strong move against classical 
phenomenology: there is no pure being nor pure appearing, but both being 
and its appearing are from the start eco-techno-logical. On the other hand, 
this does not contravene Nancy’s own ontology of corps and sense 
because these have been “ecotechnological” from the start. 
 
Ecotechnology is an ambiguous logic. Its ambiguity can best be 
understood in terms of an epochal change that we are enduring right now. 
The past world of sense (for instance the world of Hegel, Marx and even 
Heidegger) wanted to put ecotechnology in the service of production of 
sense and of aims: technological and economical activity was expected to 
serve as a general good. Supposing that this is over, in the sense that there 
are no more aims or searches after sense anymore, what remains is an 
endlessly proliferating ecotechnique that changes means to ends 
indefinitely without ever progressing anywhere. Nancy analyzes this 
situation with a new name, “struction.” The neologism comes from the 
words construction, destruction, and instruction, the common root of 
which would be, he says, struction. It means a situation that is typical of 
technological functioning, in which things are considered only insofar as 
they function and not insofar as they construct or destroy a world of sense: 
“Struo means ‘to amass,’ ‘to heap.’ It is truly not a question of order or 
organization that is implied by con- and in-struction. It is the heap, the 
non-assembled ensemble. Surely it is contiguity and co-presence, but 
without a principle of coordination” (Nancy, “Of Struction” 48-49). 
 
“[S]truction, in the sense of heaping up [amoncellement] without 
putting together [assemblage]” is the fundamental feature of our epoch of 




ecotechnology (Nancy, After Fukushima 36). This can be taken in a 
critical sense: this is a world of limitless capitalistic and technological 
growth that makes no sense other than its own self-augmentation. But it 
could also be taken in another, liberating sense, in which freedom and 
creativity would not be determined by a mourning of lost sense but could 
instead be reinvented under the rule of “struction,” supposing that the pure 
technicity of struction could reflect upon itself. Nancy does not develop 
this possibility much further, but Hörl has elaborated it in terms of a 
restricted and a general techno-ecology: if restricted echotechnics still 
aims at producing works (œuvre), general echotechnics would learn to 
enjoy the absence of œuvre, the simple inoperativity (désœuvrement). This 
would amount to working against the dream of future unification and 
coherence, working for the present plurality insofar as it is capable of 
becoming freely. Of course, when struction is analyzed in terms of eco-
technics, it is not the structure of the universe but the structure of existence 





The preceding comparative considerations of contemporary techno-
ontologies share certain common features. 
 
Firstly, three examples should be enough to show that there is 
indeed something like an epochal desire for a techno-ontology that can be 
found in all currents of continental philosophy (although this term has lost 
much of its signification, if it ever had any, since the discussion happens 
essentially in English in a style close to analytical philosophy). It is clear 
that none of the contemporary techno-ontologies can be reduced to a 
sociology of modern gadgets, for they are really ontologies that use 
technology as a key terminus technicus for a new ontology. 
 
All of the ontologies that we have surveyed here share some 
principles. All of them think Being as plurality instead of totality, but they 
admit of regional and provisional wholes and often analyze them in terms 
of “milieu,” “territory,” and “ecology.” 
 
All of these ontologies also think Being as a surprising happening or 
as a becoming without origin and end (and becoming itself is thought of as 
energy, power, working, or functioning). The technological terminology 
has been chosen precisely in order to avoid explaining becoming in terms 
of purposiveness: it is simple becoming without cause and aim, but 
nonetheless with a possibility of change and invention. It also allows for a 
                                              
13 Aurelien Barrau has shown how this can be applied to cosmological considerations in 
What’s These Worlds Coming To? 
 




breaking away from simple natural necessity, for the motive of change and 
of invention opens towards another kind of thinking of the event. 
 
All techno-ontologies under scrutiny here think being in terms of 
materiality (or corporeality), but their conception of materiality is very 
immaterial. Materiality is thought in dynamic terms: matter is energy, 
plasticity, and change; existence is eventful and surprising. Matter is 
abstract without being ideal, for it can only be encountered in reality or 
existence itself. 
 
The ultimate question of the nature of onto-technological Being is 
not about its Creator, Origin, or End, but about the modality of its being 
here and now, as it is. The modality of technological being is contingency: 
being does not rest on necessity, like in onto-theology, and neither does it 
rest on the notion of possibility, like in thinking of the Ereignis. Instead, 
being rests on the contingency of its being as it is. It could be argued that a 
techno-ontology illustrates the principle of contingency better than the 
scientifically inspired naturalist ontology first exposed by Meillassoux in 
After Finitude because it is intuitively evident that a technological object 
is a contingent invention, whereas it is somewhat counterintuitive 
(although admittedly fascinating) to think that natural laws themselves 
would be so contingent that they might suddenly change. Sometimes post-
phenomenological thinkers like Nancy analyze the experience of 
contingency in terms of surprise: surprise is the mode of encountering the 
fact that being, “without why,” nonetheless is. Said otherwise, the being of 
things is not an expected consequence of the fact of thinking being, but on 
the contrary, it is the surprise of being that makes one think.14 
 
The advantage of thinking Being in terms of technics is the intuitive 
clarity of the metaphor. Its disadvantage is the obvious artificiality of 
technics. As we saw in our discussion concerning speculative realism and 
object-oriented ontology, it is somewhat counter-intuitive to abstract 
technology from the human (or living) agency that makes or operates it. 
More importantly, as technics is neither true nor eternal, but artificial, 
fictive, and provisional, do we not have to admit that the metaphysical 
                                              
14 Nancy develops his theory of surprise in particular in his Experience of Freedom, 
which is the basis of the entire thinking of the singular plural being and of echotechnics. 
It is possible to inquire into the “materiality” of technology either through “speculative 
materialism” or through post-phenomenological “elemental thinking” (Sallis, Toadvine). 
My hypothesis is that the phenomenon of technology actually permits us to overcome the 
opposition between these two competing paradigms (the possibility of such an 
overcoming has recently been examined by Gert-Jan van der Heiden in Ontology after 
Ontotheology, but he does not speak about technology). It reveals the unjustified 
scientism in speculative materialism and nostalgia for pure nature in elemental thinking, 
and it obligates us to examine being insofar as it takes place in the contingency of the 
technological auto-production of reality. 
 




constructions examined above are nothing but artificial constructions? The 
question of the status of a techno-ontological theory will finally 
differentiate between speculative realist and post-phenomenological onto-
technologies. Knowing that technics itself is artificial and fictive, are not 
the metaphysical constructions that rely on it also mere constructions? 
 
As we have seen, Bryant and Harman, following a Deleuzian 
tradition, build speculative constructions that rely on nothing but their 
internal coherence. Does this make them false? Deleuze would say that 
this depends on what one can do with them. The value of a concept does 
not depend on its truth but on its usefulness: if it permits us to do 
something, then it is good for something—this is how consequences 
ultimately verify a hypothesis. However, without an examination of the 
constructing agent of the speculative construction, the status of the whole 
remains unclarified in the cases of Bryant and Harman (but not so in the 
case of Deleuze and Guattari, who studied philosophical techniques of 
making philosophy in What is Philosophy?). 
 
Post-phenomenological thinkers like Nancy proceed differently. 
They do not start by constructing a system and by giving form to the 
subject that could construct it. They have always started with 
deconstructions or archaeologies of inherited discourses concerning being 
and subjectivity. Their aim is not to fix a ground of being but to show how 
the question of ground comes to be and what the schemes and categories 
are through which the question is delivered to us. In this case, we have 
seen why technical and machinic categories have become useful, and why 
their obvious artificiality helps us to understand the artificial aspect of all 
enunciations of thinking. This is how one thinks Being by playing with its 
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